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Abstract 
 
I’ll propose a distinction based on historical, theoretical and linguistic considerations between: 
- two different ways of inducing a change of mind, that is persuading and convincing.  
- two different ways of proving, that is rhetorical argumentation and logical-experimental demonstration. 
There is a tendency to keep a distance from persuasion in favor of conviction. In everyday language, the difference 
between the two terms appears clear, and it is a distinction developed theoretically by many authors from Plato and Kant 
to Perelman. In particular:  
1. Persuasion is centered chiefly on the speaker: it enhances one’s will and ability to modify other people’s opinions and 
behavior; conviction is centered chiefly on the addressee and focuses on one’s capacity of being convinced and of 
evaluating rationally. The convinced addressee is more active and enterprising than the persuaded addressee, who 
remains more passive and receptive. 
2. The act of persuading should be basically connected to the idea of a process and of belief, while the act of convincing 
should be basically connected to the idea of a product and of evidence.  
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          Logic and rhetoric 
 
Logic is usually considered as being the science of the correct reasoning. Rhetoric is 
commonly considered as being the art of persuading. On the mere basis of these two definitions, 
logic and rhetoric appear to be opposite notions and faculties: first, because science and art are very 
different practices; and second, because the notion of ‘correctness’ highly differs from the notion of 
‘persuasion’.  
This opposition “logic” / “rhetoric” represents a fundamental cultural antagonism, that 
separates the “family” of concepts revolving around the ideas of truth, science, certainty, reality, 
and demonstration (a category which can be identified with logic), from the “family” of concepts 
concerning falsehood, plausibility, appearance, opinion, argumentation (a category which can be 
associated with rhetoric).  
Logical demonstration and rhetorical argumentation have two features in common: the same 
(inferential) nature, and the same function (the purpose of proving). But they also bear important 
differences: they have different subject matters, different addressees, different guiding principles, 
different languages, different contexts of use and different evaluation standards. According to these 
premises, logic and rhetoric can interact with one another on the basis of four different categories: 
exclusion, complementarity, partial overlap, and inclusion. The first case, that of exclusion, does not 
allow you to use rhetorical argumentation in logic or in science, because it has a negative function. 
In the second hypothetical situation, that of complementarity, argumentation is possible in logic and 
science, but its function remains marginal and occasional, that is not relevant. As for the third case, 
that of partial overlap, argumentation is useful and relevant, and holds an heuristic function. In the 
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fourth and last case, that one of inclusion, argumentation is essential and plays a crucial role also in 
logical and experimental evidence (cfr. Cattani, pp. 184-85).  
Negative and positive characteristics of the art of rhetoric can be schematically displayed in 
the tables below: 
 
RHETORIC 
   NEGATIVE TRAITS   POSITIVE TRAITS 
 
«Empty rhetoric, vacuous speech» 
Stylistic art 
Elocutio 
Practice of persuasion  
Manipulation, suasion 
Discursive technique    
Natural talent, un-teachable ability 
«Vir bonus dicendi peritus» 
Argumentative art 
Elocutio + Inventio, Dispositio 
Theory of persuasion  
Persuasion by argumentation  
Global strategic behaviour 
Teachable ability 
 
 
RHETORIC 
    FAULT      VALUE 
 
COGNITIVE Vicious reasoning because groundless or based 
on a-rational/irrational elements. 
Empty verbalism. 
Figures of speech. 
Argumentative schemes heuristically valid and 
apt to grasp the manifold aspects of reality. 
Educational value. 
Reasoning. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL Fallacious method, based on superficial, 
enthimematic and aphoristic formulations. 
 
Critical open-mindedness. 
ETHICAL Rhetoric is blameworthy for being deceitful 
and responsible for simulating pseudo-truths. 
 
Rhetoric is associated to prudence, anti-
authoritarianism, and challenge. 
SOCIAL Rhetoric is dangerous because of its partiality, 
demagogy, and seductive tendency. 
Rhetoric represents and promotes broad-
mindedness, anti-dogmatism, and democracy, 
tolerance. 
 
 
From a theoretical point of view, logic appears to be the most powerful resource; but from a 
pragmatic point of view it is not so, because even logic is not exempt from insidious fallacies. In 
debate, the problem does not concern the use of rhetorical moves (which seems to be unavoidable), 
but the fact that people attending the debate can possibly risk not detecting and counterbalancing 
intentional and/or unintentional fallacies, mistakes and tricks: if, using logical and rhetorical tools, 
we succeed in counteracting and neutralising them from a purely theoretical point of view (that is, 
in terms of purely intellectual categorization of strategies and techniques), we would greatly 
improve dialogue analysis and practice.  
Using the word of Alfred Snider (Snider, p. 43): «Debaters become inoculated against the use 
of persuasive techniques in exchange for good arguments because they are aware of the tactics that 
persuader use to win the mind of their audiences. More important…along with these skills emerge 
defences against being persuaded and an ethical understanding of the possible negative elements of 
persuasion. These methods can have negative effects and thus the debaters may gain a realization 
that “cheap” avenues of persuasion should be avoided».  
Provisionally and questionably, I would suggest that we should use two categories: “to 
convince” and “to persuade”, to differentiate two different kinds of effectiveness. The persuasion 
dialogue, that is the “dialogue in order to persuade”, aims at modifying people’s opinions and 
behaviours, while the “dialogue in order to convince” aims at gaining the intellectual approval of 
the interlocutor(s).  
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 Persuasion and conviction  
  
We tend to keep distance from rhetoric, especially from rhetorical moves in favour of logical 
rules. In logical terms, we prefer to speak of “rules”, while in rhetorical terms we prefer to speak of 
“moves”. Logical rules are clear and universally approved, while rhetorical moves are questionable 
and debatable.  
 
We tend to keep distance from persuasion, in favour of conviction. Conviction and persuasion 
appear different; Plato, Kant, and Perelman agree on this. Let me quote a passage from Jean-
Jacques Rousseau in which he focuses on this substantial difference:  
 
Il est aisé de convaincre un enfant que ce qu’on lui veut enseigner est utile: mais ce n’est rien de le 
convaincre, si l’on ne sait le persuader. En vain la tranquille raison nous fait approuver ou blâmer; il n’y a 
que la passion qui nous fasse agir (Rousseau, livre III, pp. 237-38).  
 
Simply considering the two English terms “to convince” and “to persuade”, we easily realize 
they are not synonymous. As a matter of fact, we can say: «It is difficult to convince someone that 
my statement is true», or: «It is almost impossible to convince a prejudiced person that her/his 
opinions do not tally with the facts»1, even though there is no linguistic structure sounding like: 
«convincing someone to do something». However, it is possible «to persuade someone to do 
something». The verb “to convince” is used only in the sense of «convincing someone of a fact», or 
to state «that a fact is what it is». If you aim to induce somebody to do something, you will better 
use the verb “to persuade”. The verb “to convince” seems referring to the realm of thinking, not that 
of doing; it does not serve to induce somebody to act, but to gain intellectual agreement and assent. 
Also in Italian we find lexical evidence for a difference between the two verbs. For example, 
the expression “logica della persuasione” (“logic of persuasion”) is admitted, while the expression 
“retorica della convinzione” (“rhetoric of conviction”) is very unconventional. Terms like 
“rational”, “reasoned”, “logical” are hardly ever associated with “persuasion”, while terms like 
“emotional”, “passionate”, “rhetorical” do not fit to “conviction”. 
 
We tend too to keep distance from polemic in favour of dialogue. In terms of discursive 
exchange, dialogue and polemic bear some mutual similarities, but from a social and ethical point 
of view they appear to be exact contraries. 
Nevertheless, in a dialogic exchange, if the interlocutors are firmly convinced of their own 
opinions, they easily use rhetorical, persuasive and polemical tools. The study and the practice of 
debate – meant primarily as public debate –, has to deal with certain opposite, essential conditions: 
co-operation and conflict, plain dialogue and crude polemic, friendly conversation and quarrel. Is a 
good discussion compatible with polemic, persuasion and rhetoric, or not? In other words: is it 
compatible with the desire to win, or not?  
Since “good” means basically ‘honest’ and ‘logic’, we should determine if ethic and logic on 
one hand, and rhetoric on the other hand, are in conflict; if conviction and persuasion are really such 
different things; if the apology of dialogue (which seems to get along with logic) and the apology of 
polemic (which seems to get along with rhetoric) may coexist. 
I would try to answer these questions starting from another question, concerning persuasion and 
conviction. The question is: why does the term dis-suasion exist while there is no entry for *dis-
conviction? We can persuade or convince somebody of something. On the contrary, even though we 
can dis-suade somebody, we cannot *dis-convince him/her. Why do we lack of a lexicographic 
entry indicating the antonym of the act of “convincing”? This anomaly tells us a lot, and it is 
equally noteworthy that it does not exist the antonym of the verb “to dedicate”, which should 
hypothetically sound like *to dis-dedicate 
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Let’s say that rhetoric is the art of persuasion; we could not say that it is the art of conviction. 
Persuasion and conviction are not interchangeable words/concepts. And the reason why they are not 
interchangeable can be explained stressing an odd and interesting lexical phenomenon: the antonym 
of the verb “to persuade” is “to dissuade”. So, what is the antonym of “to convince”, a verb which is 
often used (improperly), as synonym for “to persuade”?  
Checking the synonym and antonym finder, we can see that the antonym of “an act aiming at 
convincing or persuading someone” is explained through a word/verb which bears the idea of 
“diverting”, “urging”, “exhorting someone against (someone else)”, “persuading not to do 
something”. But the antonym of the verb “to persuade” is the verb “to dissuade”, while looking for 
the antonym of “to convince” we do not have a symmetrical correspondence.  
Consequently, admitting the significance of the common language, we end up wondering why 
does the word “dis-suasion” exist, while we do not have any entry for “*dis-conviction”, that is the 
equivalent antonym of the semantic family including “to convince” and “conviction”. The situation 
can be represented as follows: 
 
to persuade / to dissuade 
to convince / to *dis-convince 
 
In everyday language, the difference between the two terms appears clear, and – as we have 
already explained – it is a distinction developed theoretically by many authors. It can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. Persuasion refers primarily to the realm of actions; conviction refers primarily to the realm of thoughts. 
2. Persuasion concerns mainly manipulation, it has to do with the idea of “mastering” which seems absent in 
 conviction. 
3. Persuasion is an act, which makes use of emotions, while conviction does not involve any pathos.  
4. Conviction appears to be stronger and more powerful than persuasion. 
5. Unlike “to persuade”, the verb “to convince” is synonym for “to demonstrate”, “to prove”, “to verify”, “to 
 induce someone to do/think something by means of verification”. 
6. Unlike conviction, persuasion has sophistical nature. 
7. Persuasion is centred chiefly on the speaker, it enhances his/her will and ability to modify other people’s 
 opinions and behaviour; conviction is centred chiefly on the addressee, focuses on his/her capacity of 
 being convinced and evaluating rationally. The “convinced” addressee is more active and enterprising than 
 the “persuaded” addressee, who remains more passive and receptive. 
 
In short: conviction is a more crystalline, more rationally supported and more firmly 
guaranteed notion. The standard exemplification of the persuasion/conviction dynamics, according 
to the way they are used in English and Italian2, is clarified in the following table: 
 
    Persuasion    Conviction 
Action Thought 
Manipulation No manipulation 
Pathos, ethos Logos 
Weakness Strength 
Uses any means  Relies on proof and evidence  
Sophistry No sophistry  
More speaker’s action / less 
addressee’s involvement 
More addressee’s action / less 
speaker’s involvement 
 
This elementary linguistic test and this rough comparison suggest that the verb “to persuade” 
should be basically connected to the idea of a process, while the verb “to convince” should be 
basically connected to the idea of a product. A process is adaptable (like any work in progress), 
while a product is a result, a halt (like any acquired or vested right). Even democracy falls into the 
category of the “processes”; it is not a “static condition”, because it is to be acquired rather than 
simply transferred or exported. 
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However, this opposition between “conviction” and “persuasion” has to be seen as the normal 
juxtaposition between demonstration and argumentation: we usually employ argumentation, 
relegating demonstration to very few and specific cases. Consequently, our persuasion can become 
conviction only within a narrow range of specific situations: for example, when the subject matter 
or the method are appropriate, when we can apply the principle of non contradiction. 
Let us consider the following example: a judge said that mafia is not going to be defeated 
through the simple appeal to morality; it is mandatory to make people understand that this 
“rebellion” to the mafia-culture can be useful and profitable, that legality would bring profit, 
combining logic with interests, rationality with benefits. Blaise Pascal said something similar about 
the idea of “necessity” to demonstrate, first, that religion is a good thing, and then that religion is 
true. 
In a letter to Ferruccio Rossi Landi (January 20, 1960) Norberto Bobbio writes: «An order is an order 
even if it is not obeyed; an advise is an advise even if it is not taken; a medical instruction is a medical 
instruction even if it is not followed» (cfr. Quaranta: pp. 94-95).  A convincing speech is considered so even 
if the addressee is not convinced. This is one reason why there cannot be, in my opinion, an act called: *dis-
conviction. 
 
 
Aristotle’s and Lausberg’s persuasion 
 
Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric is “dúnamis perì ékaston toû theorêsai tò endekómenon 
pithanón”, namely “the faculty of discovering any available mean of persuasion for/in every 
situation” (Aristotle, 1355 b 25-26). Heinrich Lausberg’s definition of rhetoric is «the system of 
rules that assures the success of persuasion» (Lausberg, § 92). 
Aristotle defines rhetoric as “dúnamis”, that is a faculty or a “theoretical” activity aiming at 
digging up all the available means of persuasion: «the task of rhetoric is not to persuade but to 
identify what is apt to persuade in every field» (Aristotle, 1355 b 11). 
Heinrich Lausberg (confirming the ordinary sense of the common idea/concept of rhetoric) 
includes the idea of success among the goals of the art of rhetoric, in the same way as you would 
include the recovery of a patient among the goals of medical sciences.  
These two definitions seem similar; indeed, they are extremely different. Aristotle’s definition 
deals with the concept of value, while Lausberg’s deals with the concept of danger (the dangerous 
potential of rhetoric). 
This danger occurs normally when someone is firmly convinced of something and firmly 
believes in something. Conviction is a primary power. Conviction is a product. The non-irrelevant 
way to gain conviction (i.e., to get this “product”) is a process which involves and combines logical 
and rhetorical moves.  
 
Summary 
 
         We can persuade somebody to believe or to act. However, even thought we can dis-suade, we 
cannot *dis-convince him or her. It is, practically and theoretically, noteworthy that there is no a 
thesaurus entry indicating the antonym of the act of convincing, that seems related more to a logical-
experimental evidence and is centred more on the addressee, while persuading refers more to a 
rhetorical argumentation and is centered chiefly on the speaker.  
The vir bonus dicendi peritus, the honest man able to speak, neither restricts herself to theory, 
indicating values, declaring principles and asserting ideals, nor confines himself/herself to pure 
action, managing reality unaware of principles, values and ideals. Similarly, the good “discussant” 
neither uses merely logical tools, nor uses merely rhetorical moves.  
Persuasion is a key element in debate process that ultimately is persuasive in nature, because its 
goal is to persuade the audience or the judge to vote for your argument or proposal. Certainly, the 
tone of voice can be persuasive. Appeals to emotional responses, emphasis, stressing key phrases, 
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words can be persuasive. Saying the words correctly, saying the words clearly, emphasizing the 
right words can have a persuasive impact. Persuasive speech may include rhetorical structures 
(repetition examples, paradox…) and irony/humor. Confidence and calmness are positively 
persuasive techniques. 
But the central part of any debate are good arguments, that appeal to intellectual means and 
responses: the sound reasoning, the evidence, the examples are convincing. 
Briefly, the training in argumentation and debate can be a good defence against persuasion and 
ethical issues of persuasion. The “duties” (i.e.: the duty to respect logical rules) and “rights” (i.e.: 
the right to use rhetorical moves) are not necessarily in conflict. The good arguer knows and 
employs both logical tools and rhetorical moves: he is both convincing and persuading.  
 
 
References 
 
 
Aristotle (1924). Rhetoric. W.D. Ross (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Cattani A. (2011). Where the arguments of William Harvey convincing to his contemporaries? In: 
M. Dascal  and V.D. Boantza (Eds.), Controversies Within the Scientific Revolution (pp. 171-
186) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Kant (17872). Kritik der reinen Fernunft. Engl. tr.: (1933). Critique of pure reason, N. Kemp Smith 
(Ed.). London and New York: Macmillan and St Martin Press. 
Kant  (17993), Kritik der Urteilkraft. Engl.  Tr.: (1952). Critique of Judgment, J.C.Meredith (Ed.), 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Kimball B. A. (1955). Orators and Philosophers. Ohio State University: College Board.  
Lausberg, H. (19672). Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik. München: Max Hueber Verlag. 
Perelman, Ch. and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958). Traité de l’argumentation. Paris: PUF. 
Plato (1953). The Dialogues of Plato. B. Jowett (Tr.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Quaranta, M. (ed.) (2005). Carteggio inedito Norberto Bobbio-Ferruccio Rossi Landi: due filosofi a 
confronto (parte seconda 1956-1961). Foedus 13,  65-105. 
Rousseau, J.-J. (1966). Emile. Paris: Edition Garnier – Flammarion.  
Snider A. and Schnurer M. (2006). Many sides. Debate across the curriculum. New York: Idebate 
Press. 
 
1 I have found this warning in the dictionary edited by Virginia Browne, Odd pairs and false friends (1987). 
2 The distinction between two kinds of beliefs is also in Kant’s vocabulary: Überzeugung (more objective) 
and Überredung (more subjective), whose translation by Giorgio Colli and others corresponds respectively 
to “convinzione” and “persuasione” (see: Critica della ragion pura. Milano: Adelphi, 1976, pp. 797-798). 
Cf. Kritik der reinen Fernunft, 17872. Part II, chapt. II, sect. III. Cf. also Kritik der Urteilkraft, 17993, § 53, 
where Überredung is connected with Überlistung. 
 
 
